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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
OR
"HOW I CAN SATISFY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
AND STILL NOT HELP MY CLIENT"
BY: THOMAS J. MARLOWE
The United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the
assistance of counsel in the presentation of his defense.' However, the
mere fact that a lawyer is present.., does not, in and of itself, qualify as
assistance.2 The United States Supreme Court has held that "'the right
to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel."' 3
This article will provide a broad overview of the ineffective
assistance of counsel (hereinafter "IAC") claims asserted by defendants
and the rationales employed by three circuits when reviewing those
claims. Specifically, the article will provide a comparison among the
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Although
Virginia is in the Fourth Circuit this article will also review cases from
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits because the majority of capital IAC
claims have been decided in those two circuits. 4
After explaining the general law pertaining to IAC claims, the
article will compare the circuits in four general categories. Each category represents one of the typical grounds upon which JAC claims are
based or reviewed. The categories are: Failure to Investigate orPresent
Evidence; Lack of Legal Knowledge/Failure to Research the Law;
Failure to Object/Defaults; and Prejudicial Statements Made by Counsel
During Trial.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that "the purpose of the
effective assistance guarantee... is not to improve the quality of legal
representation [and] is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive
a fair trial," 5 our hope is that this material will, if only by negative
example, improve the quality of death penalty representation. A better
understanding of the unique requirements of capital defense may be
gained through a comparison and analysis of the laws dealing with what
capital defense counsel allegedly could or should have done to provide
effective assistance.

BACKGROUND
Prior to Strickland v. Washington,6 the United States Supreme
Court's review ofclaims of ineffectiveness of counsel focused primarily
upon situations where a defendant was actually denied assistance of
counsel, or where the state interfered with counsel's ability to conduct
an adequate defense In Strickland,for the first time, the Court's inquiry
focused exclusively upon defense counsel's personalperformance of
his professional duties.
In Strickland, David Washington, a prisoner sentenced to death,
sought collateral relief. Washington asserted that his counsel ineffectively presented his defense. Specifically, Washington challenged his
counsel's performance on both substantive and procedural grounds
alleging, inter alia, that counsel failed to investigate; failed to present
favorable character evidence; and utilized an improper trial strategy.8
A federal district court in Florida held an evidentiary hearing on
Washington's claims. "mhe District Court concluded that althotogh
trial counsel made errors in judgmentin failing to investigatenonstatutory
mitigating evidence further than he did, no prejudice to respondent's
sentence resulted from any such errorinjudgment." 9 The Supreme Court
ultimately granted certiorari.
The Court prefaced its opinion by noting that the policy behind the
sixth amendmentrightto counselis a concept of"fundamental fairness". 0
Prior to reviewing Washington's claim, the Court established a two-part
test to determine whether representation of a convicted defendant was so
defective as to constitute a denial of fundamental fairness:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. [hereinafter, "performance prong"] This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. [hereinafter, "prejudice prong"] This requires
showing thatcounsel's errors wereso serious as to deprive the
defendant ofa fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless
a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the
conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in
the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 1
This test is designed to be utilized by reviewing courts in both direct
appeal and collateral proceedings,' 2 and by its nature places a substantial
burden on the defendant. This burden is especially onerous due to the
independent nature of each prong of the test. Thus, even if the defendant
proves that his attorney did neglect some aspect of his defense, the
defendant has the additional burden of proving, without the aid of
hindsight, 13 that he was prejudiced by this failure.
The standard applied to the performance prong of the test is an
objective standard of reasonableness. 4 In other words, to prove that an
attorney ineffectively represented the defendant, the claimant must
prove that the attorney's performance fell below an undefined objective
standard reviewed solely upon the circumstances of the particularcase. 15
Making the test even more onerous, the Supreme Court has stated that
"[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential
... [and] [a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight... and to
evaluate the conductfrom counsel'sperspective at thetime."' 6 Thenotion
that the attorney's actions must be viewed from his/her perspective,
combined with the strong presumption against a finding of ineffectiveness,1 7 results in an almost insurmountable burden for the claimant.
Perhaps an even more insurmountable task is the claimant's burden
of overcoming the presumption that he suffered no prejudice from his
counsel's actions.' A claimant sustains this burden of proof only when
he shows'that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 9 Further, the Court noted that all
factors relating to sympathy or the particular sentencing practices of a
particular judge should not be considered, and that the reviewing court
should assume that the trier of fact acted in accordance with the law.1
The question therefore becomes whether there exists a reasonable
probability that, without the errors, the sentencer would have concluded
21
that the defendant did not deserve a sentence of death.
The Strickland Court's instruction to avoid the benefits of hindsight, combined with the broad objective standard utilized under the
performance prong of the Stricklandanalysis, provide reviewing courts
great latitude in their determination of appropriate attorney conduct. An
additional factor contributing to the claimant's burden is the fact that a
court is not required to address both parts of the test if it finds that the
claimant failed to prove either prong. 2 "If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,
which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.' '
Applying its test to the facts, the Court found that Washington's
counsel acted within the reasonable bounds of attorney conduct and
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employed one of a myriad ofpotential trial strategies available. Further,
the Court found that Washington had not suffered any prejudice by these
omissions or choices34
APPLICATION OF THE STRICKLAND STANDARD IN THE
FOURTH, FIFTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS
This article will provide examples of what is and is not considered
ineffective assistance of counsel. It should be noted that despite the
burdens which a claimant must overcome to prevail on an IAC claim,
ineffective assistance of counsel does occur and can be successfully
challenged.
Although there are a large number and variety of IAC claims, the
following categories are the areas in which most claims arise.
I. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE OR PRESENT EVIDENCE:
A) Fourth Circuit:
Briley v. Bassn applied the prejudice prong of the Stricklandtest
in the manner suggested as most efficient by the Supreme Court. In
Briley, the defendant was sentenced to death for the murder ofa five year
old child during the commission of a robbery. 6 Briley asserted on federal habeas a claim that his attorney failed to present mitigation evidence
during the sentencing phase of his trial.27 The court found that he failed
to satisfy the prejudiceprong of the Strickland test.u
The only mitigation evidence presented by counsel during the
penalty phase was the testimony of Briley's parole officer, who testified
that his employment record was good, and that Briley observed the rules
of parole. In his habeas appeal, Briley asserted that additional mitigation
witnesses were available and should have been called by his counsel.29
The court noted, however, that with only one exception, Briley had not
established how the additional witnesses would testify20 The one exception was his mother whom
the court found most likely would have
31
been a "sympathy" witness.
After a brief review of the evidence, the Fourth Circuit applied the
prejudice prong of the Strickland test and held that Briley received
effective assistance of counsel. The court stated that the true problem
was a lack of suitable mitigation evidence and not counsel's actions. 2
Although the court noted that Briley's mother may have been helpful to
the defense, it did not find it necessary to pursue the question of whether
the attorney was negligent in failing to call her as a witness because
Briley could not satisfy the second prong of the test.The courtnoted with
respect to the absence of the mother's testimony, "it certainly [did] not
suggest a 'reasonable probability' that the result reached by the jury
would have differed had they been exposed to it."33
Another case dealing with alleged failure to investigate and adequately present evidence was Turnerv. Bass.' However, in Turner,the
court's inquiry focused upon the performance prong of the Strickland
test rather than the prejudice prong.
Turner claimed that his attorn.s' ignorance had caused them to
"mishandle the psychiatric testim ny and mitigating evidence."35 The
court reviewed the attomeys' actio s based upon the evidence contained
in the record and found Turner's c
to be frivolous.3 In particular,
the court focused upon the fact th Turner's attorneys requested a
private psychiatrist and, after initial being denied, persisted and
37
eventually prevailed in their request.
The psychiatrist, along with several other mitigation witnesses,
testified during the sentencing phase of Turner's trial. The court found
the doctor's testimony helpful to the defense, but noted that the mitigation evidence was simply insufficient to dissuade thejury from imposing
the death penalty. 38 The holding exemplifies the strong presumption
inherent in the Strickland test that an attorney's actions, viewed in the
context of the time at which he acted, are presumed to be correct and
reasonable. 9

Another case expressing this proposition is Roach v. Martin," in
which the defendant asserted that his attorneys were ineffective during
the sentencing phase due to, among other things, their lack of investigation of potential defenses. In essence, Roach argued that his attorney
failed to investigate or discover the fact that Roach had Huntington's
disease;4" and that his attorney failed to research the side effects of
narcotics on a stricken individual, and that as a result, Turner lost a
potential opportunity to assert a theory of insanity or involuntary drug
42
induced psychosis.
The court dismissed his claim and held that his counsel's actions,
viewed at the time at which they were done, were reasonable and within
acceptable standards of performance. The court based its decision upon
its impression of counsel's behavior and his assertion that his actions
were predicated upon information provided by the defendant. Specifically, the court found that it was reasonable for counsel to have failed to
further investigate this defense because the accused had recalled details
of the murder so precisely that it was consistent with his prior statement
that he had only drunk some alcohol and smoked alittlemarijuana. 43 The
court noted that the defendant had not told his counsel the truth regarding
his drug use until the day on which they were to enter their plea. Thus,
the court judged the attorney's actions based upon his reasonable
reliance on his client's statements4 and the eventual defense strategy
employed, which focused upon Roach's mental abnormalities. 45
B) Fifth Circuit:
The Fifth Circuit, compared to the Fourth Circuit, has decided a
significantly greater number of IAC cases. 6 Thus, that court has had a
greater opportunity to develop a body of case law interpreting various
aspects of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. It should be noted
that, as in the Fourth Circuit, the majority of the claims allege counsel's
failure to investigate.
A very recent Fifth Circuit decision, Smith v.Black, 7unfortunately
parallels the Fourth Circuit's tendency to accord great deference to the
"strategy" employed by trial attorneys. In Smith, the petitioner alleged
that his attorney had failed to present an adequate case in mitigation."
In essence, Smith claimed that his counsel failed to present mental
retardation evidence.
During an evidentiary hearing before the district court, Smith
produced undisputed evidence that his I.Q. was approximately 70 and
that he was incapable of comprehending the nature of his crime or
assisting in his own defense.4 9 The Fifth Circuit opined that, although
failure to present mental retardation evidence was not the result of a
comprehensive trial strategy, Smith nevertheless failed to satisfy the
deficiency or prejudice prong of the Strickland test.50
The court based its holding upon the fact that Smith's behavior did
not blatantly indicate the need for expert testimony and that the defense
focused upon an assertion of innocence. 51 The court reasoned that because Smith testified, thejury was presented with a sufficient opportunity
to personally evaluate his capabilities and capacity.52 The court found
that adequate mitigation evidence was also presented through the
testimony of five character witnesses.53 The court concluded that the
impact of any professional evidence pertaining to competency would
not have been likely to alter the jury's decision.
Another case in which defense counsel failed to submit evidence of
the defendant's mental incompetence was Wilson v. Butler.-4 In Wilson,
the petitioner maintained that his trial counsel failed to adequately,
investigate or prepare a case in mitigation based upon his mental
infirnities. Wilson's appointed counsel stated that although he had
learned that the accused may have had problems since childhood, he at
no time "investigate[d] the history of Wilson's mental problems;
determine[d] the existence of relevant psychological, psychiatric, or
probation records; or attempt[ed] to consult with, or have Wilson
examined by, a competent psychiatrist or psychologist."55
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In his habeas petition Wilson presented evidence that he was unable
to conform or appreciate the significance of his conduct and that such
inabilities were a result of his low I.Q. score of 66. Upon presentation
of this evidence, the Fifth Circuit elected to apply the prejudice prong of
the Stricklandtest and found that it was insufficient to sustain Wilson's6
assertion that his counsel should have presented an insanity defense.
The court did find, however, that Wilson alleged a valid ineffective
assistance ofcounsel claim against his attorney for failure to present this
evidence as a mitigating circumstance during the penalty phase of the
57
trial.
Finding that the failure to present this evidence was "both professionally unreasonable and prejudicial,"58 the court noted, "if the mitigating circumstance of mental impairment had been established, the
district court might conclude that the degree of likelihood that a jury
would not have recommended a death sentence is sufficient to undermine
its confidence in the outcome of this phase of the trial."59
In Nealy v. Cabana, the Fifth Circuit did not hesitate to find
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Nealy, the petitioner testified,
professed his innocence, and was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. On collateral appeal he claimed that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to investigate or obtain
the testimony ofwitnesses whom Nealy claimed could establish an alibi.
This testimony was especially significant because the heart ofthe state's
case was the testimony of a confessed murderer who implicated Nealy
in exchange for a reduced sentence.
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, which had found
that even ifthe representation Nealy received was deficient, Nealy failed
to establish prejudice under Strickland.6' The Court found that Nealy's
counsel made no attempt beyond a phone call to secure the testimony of
the witnesses and noted "that, at a minimum, counsel had the duty to
interview potential witnesses and to make an independent investigation
of the facts and circumstances of the case." 2
A type of IAC claim which has not yet been presented to the Fourth
Circuit was reviewed in bothSawyer v.Butler6s andRomero v.Lynaugh.6'
In each of these cases, the petitioner alleged that defense counsel
committed error by failing to make any closing arguments. 5
Sawyer alleged on habeas that failure to give a closing argument
during the guilt phase of a trial is tantamount to an abandonment of the
case.' In response, his trial attorney testified that he was familiar with
the prosecutor and that the prosecutorroutinely saved his best statements
for rebuttal. Convinced that a guilty verdict would be returned, the
attorney stated that he had hoped to save his arguments for the penalty
phase in the hopes of avoiding the death penalty.67 The Court applied the
prejudice prong of the Stricklandtest and found thatuSawyer had failed
to establish what the attorney might have said to possibly alter the
verdict.'
A similar denial was the result in Romero, in which the petitioner
claimed that the closing argument offered by his counsel during the
sentencing phase was wholly inadequate:
Ladies and Gentleman, I appreciate the time you took deliberating and the thought you put into this. I'm going to be
extremely brief. I have areputation fornot being brief. [asked
petitioner to stand up] You are an extremely intelligent jury.
You've got that man's life in your hands. You can take it or
not. That's all I have to say.69
The district court granted Romero relief and found that this type of
argument constituted deficient representation under the first prong of the
Stricklandtest by preventing the jury from considering any mitigating
factors such as Romero's youth, intoxication and family background.70
On the state's appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court reversed this finding
and held that Romero's attorney provided constitutionally effective
representation. 71 The court noted:

Romero's youth was obvious.., the fact is that the evidence
of possible mitigating factors was before the jury... we are
not prepared to fault [the attorney's] effort to highlight the
heavy responsibility of the jury by not burdening them with
the obvious and avoiding the risk of losing them by arguing
72
the absurd.
It appears clear that although the Fifth Circuit may be more
experienced in reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims than
the Fourth Circuit, it does not appear to have developed a significantly
less rigorous application of the Strickland standard.
C) Eleventh Circuit:
Illustrative of the principle that defense counsel must perform reasonable investigations to discover possible mitigating evidence is Tyler
v. Kemp.73 In Tyler, the petitioner confessed to poisoning her husband
and was subsequently convicted of first degree murder. Her appointed
counsel, Bishoff, was an inexperienced attorney who had never tried a
capital case. At the sentencing phase of Ms. Tyler's trial, Bishoff failed
to present any evidence and the jury imposed the death sentence.7 4
Denied state habeas relief,Tylerpetitioned the federal district court
and alleged that Bishoff rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
during the sentencing phase ofher trial.7 5 The district court granted relief
and found that Bishoff's failure to present any evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 76 The State appealed and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed, finding that Tyler had satisfied both the performance
and prejudice prong of the Strickland test." "Here the jury was given no
information to aid them in the penalty phase. The death penalty that
resulted in this case was thus robbed of the reliability essential to assure
confidence in that decision." 8
The court discussed the fact that Bishoff's investigation consisted
of nothing more than speaking with several members of Tyler's family
forafew hours atthe jail.7 9 It should be noted that although Bishoff asked
Tyler's brother, grandmother and aunt to testify at trial, they refused.
The explanation for their reticence was that "they knew nothing of the
murder and had nothing to tell." 0 However, the reason for their refusal
was Bishoff's error in failing to explain the basis or benefit of their
testimony.
During the evidentiary hearing, Tyler's relatives testified that
Bishoff did not explain the concept of mitigation, and they simply
assumed that he was seeking evidence of guilt or innocence.8 At the
hearing they testified thathad they understood thenature ofthe sentencing
proceeding, they would have agreed to present evidence that Ms. Tyler
had no prior criminal record, that her husband was an abusive alcoholic,
and that she was a devoted wife and mother.82 The Court also noted that
a diligent attorney would have searched for potentially mitigating
evidence from sources other than Tyler's immediate family, such as her
previous employer.83

Il. LACK OFLEGAL KNOWLEDGEIFAILURE TO RESEARCH THE
LAW:
A) Fourth Circuit:
Although a few capital murder cases in the Fourth Circuit mention
IAC claims based upon lack of knowledge or research, there is only one,
Hyman v. Aiken,8 which explicitly discusses the issue. Hyman is also
perhaps the most egregious example of lack of representation.
InHyman, the Fourth Circuit held that petitioner had satisfied both
prongs of the Strickland test and that he was entitled to discharge or to
a new trial.n The issue in Hyman involved the trigger-man rule and
resolution ofthe question ofwho actually committed amurderduring the
commission of a robbery. Hyman's habeas counsel claimed that the
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inadequate representation given during the guilt phase of the trial
prejudiced Hyman during the penalty phase. Upon reviewing the facts,
the Court found that Hyman satisfied the first prong of the Stricklandtest
by showing that his counsel, Demetrious Stratos, failed to provide
adequate representation as envisioned by the sixth amendment.
The Court discussed several aspects of Stratos' representation
which it found could not be "considered the result of deliberate,
informed trial strategy." 6 Specifically, the Court noted the following
unjustifiable errors:
1.) Stratos failed to update or purchase new reporters for some
period of time?
2.) Stratos didnot possess or read acopy of the deathpenalty statute
listing the aggravating and mitigating factors before the penalty trial
began."
3.) Stratos and assistant counsel admitted that once Hyman moved
only met with him three
to have them dismissed, they resented him 8and
9
more times over a period of three months.
4.) Stratos' lack of knowledge caused him to erroneously interpret
the law, and to advise Hyman to plead guilty to murder in exchange for
a life sentence to avoid what Stratos believed was the possibility of accomplice liability and a sentence of death.9°
5.) Stratos failed to call vital defense witnesses, such as Hyman's
wife, who had already testified at her own trial that another member of
their "gang" had committed the murder.9'
6.) Stratos failed to oppose the State's motion to exclude testimony
regarding the fact that one of their chief witnesses received a pardon in
exchange for his testimony. 92
7.) Neither Stratos nor his assistant acquired the statement of the
victim's brother, the only eyewitness to the crime, in which he stated that
a woman shot the deceased. 93
8.) Stratos "reviewed" the State's file, but failed to acquire a copy
of Hyman's "confession" ormention its existence on directexamination,
thereby allowing the State to use it as impeachment evidence? 4
After acknowledging the lack of preparation and obvious unprofessional behavior, the Court also noted that "but for his counsel's...
errors, there is areasonable probability that the outcome ofthe sentencing
phase of Hyman's trial would have been different."95
Although this is a relatively clear case of attorney incompetence,
there is no case even suggesting a "bright line" between effective and
ineffective assistance ofcounsel. However, a non capital case, Williams
v. Kelly96 would seem to indicate that the Fourth Circuit is willing to
condone very questionable "tactics". In Williams, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the finding of the District Court that an attorney had failed to
render effective assistance, thereby prejudicing his client's defense.97
The accused alleged that his counsel's performance was deficient
because he had failed to make a motion to strike at the close of the State's
case, and because he elected to have the accused testify even though the
accused's testimony was the only way in which one of the elements of
the crime could be proved. 98
In a subsequent federal habeas action, the District Court found that
the State's case would not have survived a motion to strike and,
therefore, counsel erred by failing to make such a motion. The lower
court found that by allowing the accused to testify, counsel clearly
misunderstood the applicable law:

It strains logic ... to conclude that an attorney does his client
any service by putting his client on the witness stand to admit
all of the elements of the offense with which he is charged,
after the Commonwealth has failed to prove its case...
Moreover, had it not been for counsel's incompetence, petitioner could not have been convicted of the crime for which
he is now imprisoned. 99
Despite this finding, theFourth Circuit applied the first prong ofthe
Strickland test and held that the attorney's "challenged actions emerge
as sound trial strategy that fell well'within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance." ' 100The court based its finding upon the fact
that a police officer testified as to the circumstances surrounding an oral
confession made by the defendant. The court reasoned that since the
defendant stated that he "snatched" the stolen property from the victim
while his accomplice intended to knock the victim down, itwas reasonably
possible that counsel would have inferred that his confession and the
officer's testimony were sufficient for a finding of guilt if the defendant
failed to take the stand.
Thus, although the law in Fourth Circuit is not well developed in
this aspect ofattorney competence, it is clear that the Court's inclination
is to give great weight to the presumption that an attorney's actions were
reasonable.
B) Fifth Circuit:
Despite the fact that there are a greater number and variety of IAC
decisions in the Fifth Circuit, none involved situations where counsel
was as blatantly unprepared as in Hyman v. Aiken.
Although not a capital case, a helpful and educational decision is
Burley v. Cabana.'0' In Burley, the petitioner was convicted of murder
and received a sentence of life imprisonment. At federal habeas Burley
asserted that his counsel was ineffective by failing to inform the trial2°
judge of the sentencing options available under the Youth Court Act.1
The Court of Appeals adopted the Magistrate's findings:
"The record indicates that Judge Gordon mistakenly believed
that life imprisonment was the only sentence available...
Judge Gordon statedin his opinionthathethoughtthe sentence
was harsh andthat he would nothave even given the maximum
under a manslaughter conviction. He practically cries out for
an alternative. Had Henry conducted even a minimal investigation of the law, he could have offered one. To be considered effective, counsel has a duty to make at least a
minimum investigation of the law, especially on such an
important issue as sentencingmitigation ....,03
Although the Fifth Circuit has held that counsel must investigate
the law pertaining to the defendant's case, the court has not required
counsel to accurately convey that information to the defendant. In Czere
v.Butler,1 4 the petitioner claimed that his plea of guilty to two counts of
second degree murder should be deemed involuntary because he relied
upon erroneous information provided by his counsel. Specifically,
Czere alleged that counsel advised him that he would be eligible for
parole within fifteen years where in fact he was required to serve a
minimum of eighty years on the two life terms.'0s Czere alleged that the
difference between fifteen and eighty years would have altered his
decision to plead guilty.
Denying habeas relief, the Fifth Circuit applied a clearly erroneous
standard and adopted the district court's finding that parole was not
overly important to Czere at the time his plea was entered and that his
primary concern was to avoid the death penalty.'06 The Court noted that
Czere's counsel advised him that he would be in jail at least forty years,
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and that Czere never testified that the difference between forty and
eighty years would have made him risk imposition ofthe death penalty."°7
The Court stated, "[i]t
is not ourrole to assume the existence ofprejudice.
Regardless of how plausible a showing... might be, Strickland requires
that the petitioner 'affirmatively prove' prejudice."'' 8 In essence, the
Court held that reviewing courts must weigh all of the factors confronting
the defendant when determining the effect any inaccurate information
had on the defendant's decision to enter a plea.'19
A novel ineffective assistance of counsel claim was presented in
Felde v. Butler."0 In that case, the petitioner, a Vietnam veteran
suffering from delayed stress syndrome, originally testified and requested
the jury to impose the death penalty. The IAC claim raised on collateral
appeal essentially sought to establish aperse rule that defense counsel
cannot properly fulfill their duty pursuant to the sixth amendment while
following their client's wishes and advocating imposition of the death
penalty."'
The Fifth Circuit recognized that philosophical and legal issues
were involved in such a claim, but then refused to address the issues."'
Rather, the Court utilized the prejudice prong of the Stricklandtest and
found that "even if ... making such an argument renders counsel
a different
ineffective, in this case there is no reasonable probability that
3
result would have ensued had counsel remained silent.""
C) Eleventh Circuit:
An unusual case resulting in the granting of relief was Magill v.
4
Dugger."1
In Magill,a part-time assistant public defender, Hale Stancil,
was assigned to represent the defendant on a charge of first degree
murder. In preparation for trial, Stancil met and discussed the case with
the head of the public defender's office, Robert Pierce. On the first day
of jury selection, however, Robert Pierce unexpectedly entered the
courtroom and announced that he would represent Magill." 5 The court
noted that Pierce met Magill only fifteen minutes before the proceedings
began, and that he had not participated in any ofthe pre-trial discovery. ' 6
Magill alleged that Pierce committed numerous errors throughout
the guilt phase of the trial. Priorto reviewing the claims individually, the
Court of Appeals stated that "[tihis case presents a clear example of
attorney performance which is outside the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance... Pierce was woefully unprepared to defend
7
Magill.""
Through review of the record, the court discerned that the heart of
the proffered defense was Magill's alleged lack of premeditation." 8 The
heart ofcounsel's error was failure to prepare Magill to testify. The court
found that the critical errors occurred during the prosecution's crossexamination, when Magill stated that he fired the second and third shots
with the intent to kill the victim." 9 Pierce failed to object to the entire
line of questioning, including the prosecution's successful attempt to
degree murder.27
elicitMagill's opinion as to whetherhe committed first
"The prosecutor's questions clearly were leading to this end, yet counsel
sat silently while his client told the jury he was guilty of capital murder
...that question was the ultimate question for the jury to decide."''
The court found that the prejudice prong ofStricklandhad not been
satisfied as to the conviction, but vacated the death sentence on the
grounds that it could have been affected by the error. "Although the guilt
and penalty phases are considered 'separate' proceedings, we cannot
occurring during the former upon the jury's
ignore the effect of events
2
decision in the latter." 2
A case in which the court adopted a perhaps unrealistic view of the
adversary process is Davis v. Kemp. 23 In Davis, the defense counsel
attempted to bolster his case by calling a witness whom he alleged had
coerced Davis into killing the victim. 24 On direct examination, counsel
asked the witness to state his name and then indicated that he had no
further questions. He alleged that his trial strategy was to simply
"display" the witness so that the jury could see his size, and infer that
Davis was coerced. 27 The problem was that the defense attorney had

erroneously assumed that in Georgia,
the prosecution's cross would be
126
limited to the scope of direct.
Davis claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and alleged that
because of his counsel's actions, the state was able to obtain damaging
testimony. However, the court held that because the state could have
called the witness as their own, Davis' argument that his counsel allowed
the state to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence was incorrect. 27 The
significance of the court's holding is evident in its statement that "there
is no indication that the state could not have located [the witness] to call
as a rebuttal witness."'' 2 In holding that Davis failed to show prejudice,
the court seems to disregard the reality of the situation that the testimony
simply would not have been available absent counsel's error.

Ill. FAILURE TO OBJECTIDEFAULTS:
A) Fourth Circuit:
Recent Fourth Circuit decisions demonstrate that an increasing
number of claims will be dismissed based upon procedural principles.
The most recent Fourth Circuit opinion, Justusv. Murray, 29 applied the
principles of procedural default outlined in Slayton v. Parrigan9 and
Wainwrightv. Sykes' 3 ' to bar both the substantive and the IAC claims.3 2
The rule in Slayton, in essence, states that a failure to raise claims which
could have been raised at trial, on direct appeal, orin a prior state habeas
proceeding, will bar furtherreview. Sykes extends this rule to the federal
forum by denying federal review of a claim procedurally barred on state
grounds unless the petitioner shows both "cause" excusing the default,
and "prejudice" from a lack of federal review.
The Fourth Circuit decision affirmed the judgment of the District
Court denying habeas relief, and outlined the progression of Justus'
appeals. In Justus, the petitioner asserted substantive claims in his
petition for state habeas that were not raised on direct appeal. Pursuant
to the principles established in Slayton, the state habeas court found that
his claims were procedurally defaulted. Justus then presented these
claims to a federal magistrate who also rejected them because Justus
failed to offer a cognizable excuse for the default. Objecting to the
findings of the magistrate, Justus for the first time, offered as an excuse
for the default of his substantive claims the ineffectiveness of his
counsel. However, the district court affirmed the magistrate's findings
because, not only was the IAC claim not listed in the petition or alleged
as error, but also because it was not presented to and exhausted in the
state courts. 33 Thus, in addition to his substantive claims, his IAC claim
was also procedurally defaulted.
Another case in which the Fourth Circuit disposed of claims based
upon the doctrine ofprocedural default was Colemanv. Thompson."" In
Coleman, the petitioner filed his notice ofappeal from an adverse ruling
of the state habeas court one day late. The Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal, and Coleman unsuccessfully petitioned the
District Court for federal habeas relief.
Ofnote in the Fourth Circuit's denial of habeas relief is its comment
that Coleman's reliance on Murray v. Carrier33 was misplaced and that
Coleman's assertion that his procedural default was excusable due to
IAC was untenable. The Fourth Circuit based its holding upon the fact
that prisoners seeking state habeas relief have no constitutional right to
counsel,2 6 therefore, they cannot be denied effective assistance of
counsel. 3 7
Another aspect of procedural default arises when the defendant
fails to object to an alleged error during the trial or fails to raise the issue
ondirectappeal. The Fourth Circuit generally applies a strict procedural
analysis in these cases. Similar to the petitioner in Coleman, the petitioner in Waye v. Townley' alleged that his procedurally defaulted
Sandstromclaim'39 was still reviewableby the federal courts because the
default was caused by the ineffectiveness of his counsel. 4°
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Applying an analysis similar to that utilized in Wainwrightv. Sykes,
the Fourth Circuit held that Waye was required to prove prejudice under
both Strickland and Sykes before he would have been entitled to relief
from the procedural bar.'4 ' Each of the tests has a prejudice prong which
requires the petitioner to prove that, in general, the outcome of the trial,
or fundamental fairness has been undermined. Waye alleged Strickland
prejudice based upon his counsel's failure to object to the improper jury
instruction on Sandstromgrounds. 42 However, the court noted that even
if he was able to show that his attorney did not provide effective
assistance, he would not be able to satisfy the second prong of43the
Stricklandtest by showing actual prejudice as required by Sykes.
Thus, the court again showed its willingness to employ the complicated procedural rules surrounding state procedural requirements to
deny relief to death sentenced prisoners.
B) Fifth Circuit:
It appears that one area in which the Fourth Circuit has dealt with
issues virtually untouched by the Fifth Circuit is procedural defaults.
The only analogous Fifth Circuit case, Streetman v. Lynaugh' T ,
involved federal review of whether defense counsel had "lost" a claim
by failing to develop evidence at one stage in the state habeas process.
After being denied state habeas, Streetman sought a federal evidentiary
hearing raising, for the first time, the admissibility of his confession.
Streetman also alleged that his trial and state habeas counsel was
ineffective for failing to create a factual basis for his inadmissibility
claim. 145
Streetman alleged that his confession was coerced because the
police physically threatened him and his family and also promised that
no information would be used against him. 46 The court determined that
because the prosecutor admitted that without the confession the state's
case was quite weak, "there exists a reasonable probability that the
outcome of his trial would have been different."' 47 The court also found
that failure to challenge the confession constituted IAC, but that the
failure to develop the challenge at state habeas was the result of
institutional impediments that affected counsel's performance. 4
Habeas counsel filed its petition and the state district court ordered
the hearing to begin the next morning. Habeas counsel had less than one
hour to speak with Streetman prior to the hearing and, therefore,
requested a continuance to subpoena witnesses and to pursue an investigation of additional information not within the record.'4 9 Despite
the fact that habeas counsel was woefully unprepared, the state court
refused to grant a continuance. As a result, habeas counsel did not learn
of the possible involuntary nature of Streetman's confessions until after
the hearing. 150
The court noted that "[w]hat is clear from the foregoing facts is that
neither Streetman nor his habeas attorney made a tactical choice to leave
evidence regarding the voluntariness of [the] confessions undeveloped.
Instead, the failure was due to counsel's lack ofopportunity to prepare.''
writ, and remanded the
Therefore, the court reversed the denial of5the
2
case for a full federal evidentiary hearing.
C) Eleventh Circuit:
When the state opposes a petitioner's request for habeas relief and
establishes grounds of procedural default, the petitioner must satisfy
both the cause and prejudice standards elucidated in Wainwright v.
Sykes. 53 In addition, if the petitioner asserts that his "cause" for the
procedural default is IAC, then he must also prove that his representation
was ineffective under Strickland."
In Stephens v. Kemp, 5 the state argued that Stephens' claim was
procedurally barred by Georgia's habeas petition statute.' 56 The state
argued that because Stephens first raised his IAC claim in his second
state petition, and because the state held it procedurally barred it should,

therefore, be barred from federal review. 57 The court of appeals addressed this contention and found that Stephens' satisfied the cause and
prejudice standard of Sykes and that the federal courts were entitled to
58
hear his defaulted claim.
The court found "cause" for Stephens' failure to raise the claim "in
the fact that [his] trial counsel, whose effectiveness is here challenged,
also represented him in the first state habeas proceeding." ' 9 Prior to
finding prejudice under Sykes, however, the court analyzed whether
Stephens' counsel was, in fact ineffective. First the court noted that his
attorney was appointed just two days before his arraignment, and two
days after the court had already ordered a psychiatric evaluation of the
defendant.'" In addition, the attorney was informed by Stephens' sister
that he had spent time in a mental institution shortly before the time of
the offense.
The psychiatrist who examined Stephens' filed a written report
6
which stated that he could fmnd no evidence of mental disease ordefect.' '
The report also contained a passing reference to Stephens' brief stint in
the mental hospital. Despite this information, Stephens' attorney did not
pursue his investigation of petitioner's mental condition any further.
The Court found this reliance on the psychiatrist's report reasonable
with respect to the guilt phase of the trial, but not with respect to the
sentencing phase.
[W]hen a capital sentencing proceeding is contemplated by
counsel aware of the facts of which appellant's trial counsel
was aware, professionally reasonable representation requires
more of an investigation into the possibility of introducing
evidence of the defendant's mental history and mental capacity in the sentencing phase than was conducted by trial counsel
in this case. 62
The court concluded that Stephens had satisfied both the performance and prejudice prong of the Strickland test. 63 The court utilized
its analysis under Strickland as grounds for deciding that the petitioner
had satisfied the prejudice standard under Sykes. Consequently, IAC
was successfully presented as an excuse for procedural default.
The Eleventh Circuit has also held defense counsel ineffective
when it has been found that they failed to object to unreliable scientific
evidence. In Chatom v. White,'61 Chatom was convicted of murdering
two sheriff's deputies. His conviction was based primarily upon an
expert's testimony and the test results from an atomic absorption test.'6
The state performed the tests on an alleged accomplice of Chatom's,
with the hope of proving by inference that if the accomplice did not fire
the weapon, Chatom must have.166
The court noted that Chatom's counsel failed to object to the
introduction of this evidence despite the fact that the prosecution
violated a discovery order by failing to inform Chatom that such test
results existed. The court proceeded to analyze Chatom's claim under
the performance prong of the Strickland test, and held that although the
situations are rare where one error will warrant a finding of IAC, the
absorption test was one such case due to its critical nature as corroboration of the prosecution's circumstantial evidence. 61
The court also concluded that counsel's failure fulfilled the prejudice
prong ofthe Stricklandtest.'1 The Court's reasoning was simple: "While
a timely objection by Chatom's counsel may not have excluded the
evidence of the atomic absorption test, the lack of any objection clearly
prejudiced Chatom since the adversarial testing contemplated by the
sixth amendment did not occur."' 69 The court noted that Chatom had also
proven prejudice by the fact that his counsel's error prevented this issue
from being addressed in direct or collateral appeals.
IV. PREJUDICIALSTATEMENTS MADE BY COUNSEL DURING
TRIAL:
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A) Fourth Circuit:
The law of the Fourth Circuit is only beginning to develop in the
area regarding an attorney's prejudicial statements. The developments,
however are anything but favorable to capital defendants. It appears that
the Court of Appeals is quite tolerant of attorneys who inadvertently
"slander" their clients.
For example, in Brown v. Dixon70 the petitioner, Brown, claimed
that his counsel was ineffective during closing argument because he
intentionally conceded petitioner's guilt 7' without his approval and also
admitted the existence of the statutory aggravating factors warranting
72
death.
The District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
granted relief, holding that Brown's trial counsel had potentially
affected the outcome of the proceeding. 73 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
reversed and found that the attorney's actions were within the bounds of
his authority and that his statements were part ofan overall trial strategy.
Specifically, the court noted that they would not recommend this as a
routine method of defense, but only found that it was a reasonable under
the circumstances. 74
Similarly, the petitionerin Clozza v. Murray, 75 asserted that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing
phase ofhis capital murder trial. Specifically, Clozzamaintained that his
attorney breached his duty of loyalty by uttering remarks during trial
which conceded Clozza's guilt and prejudiced his defense.
For example, Clozza's attorney stated during his closing argument
that "he did not want to put petitioner 'back on the street' and that if
Clozza's attempt at suicide had been successful, 'it would not have been
the greatest tragedy.""176 Upon its review of these comments, the Fourth
Circuit held that they did not prejudice Clozza's defense and further
noted that a successful defense was an almost impossible task."7 The
Court ofAppeals refused to "second-guess counsel's tactical choices"' 8
and adopted the reasoning of the state habeas court. The state court had
found that Clozza's attorney adopted a defense theory based upon his
credibility with the jury:
The remarks which Clozza contends showed hopelessness
and disgust indicated to the jury that defense counsel understood the gravity of the crimes as well as their horrible nature.
Had counsel attempted to pass the crimes off as anything other
than the atrocities that they were, his credibility with the jury
would most certainly become suspect. Thus, we conclude that
179
counsel's remarks were consistent with his trial strategy.
The Fourth Circuit then addressed the effectiveness prong of the
Strickland test and stated that "almost anything other than an open
confession ofcompleteguiltshould withstand an ineffectiveness laim."110
The court also summarily addressed the prejudice prong of the test and
found that it was unlikely that, but for counsel's errors, the result would
have been different.' 8 '
Thus, although the law pertaining to IAC claims based upon
attorney misconduct is quite new, the Fourth Circuit appears willing to
shape its analysis to deny relief in any case "short of an open confession
of complete guilt."
B) Fifth Circuit:
An unfortunate similarity exists between the Fourth and Fifth
circuits in the manner in which they dispose of IAC claims based upon
allegedly improper and prejudicial remarks by counsel.
In two cases,Matthesonv.Kingln andRushingv. Butler,113theFifth
Circuit addressed IAC claims based upon statements of counsel that
allegedly prejudiced their clients. In both cases, the court apparently
relied upon the presumption that attorneys are required to make tactical
decisions and that those decisions should be accorded great deference.

In Mattheson, for example, the petitioner complained that during
voir dire his counsel described the crime as "gross and heinous" and
admitted that Mattheson was a murderer.'14 However, the Fifth Circuit
accorded great weight to his counsel's explanation:
[Counsel] had decided to be as candid as possible with the
jury, presumably to build up his credibility and that of his
theory of the case... Applying the presumption that the
challenged action was taken as a matter of sound trial strategy, we cannot say that counsel's remarks... were outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance.In
Similarly, in Rushing defense counsel made statements during his
closing argument which tended to concede the petitioner's guilt. 86
Again, the Court relied upon the trial strategy presumption and held that
7
Rushing's claims failed both prongs of the Strickland test. 1
C) Eleventh Circuit:
The Eleventh Circuit has also reviewed IAC claims where the
petitioner alleges that his counsel's statements have prejudiced his
88
defense. For the purpose of this article only one, Messer v. Kemp,
merits review.
In Messer, the petitioner alleged that counsel was ineffective
throughout both the guilt and sentencing phases.
Messer's allegations of ineffectiveness are based upon the fact that his
counsel, Sawhill, did not make an opening statement, nor did he present
a case-in-chief. 189 Further, Sawhill made statements during his closing
arguments which Messer argued conceded guilt and prejudiced his
defense:' 90
I would be no less honest with each and every one of you if I
tried to tell you the evidence said something other than what
[the prosecutor] indicates occurred. 191
Further, Sawhill continued to prejudice his client's defense during the
sentencing phase by intimating that acareful analysis of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances might warrant imposition of the death
penalty:
I dare say, and it has been suggested to me... that I ought to
argue to this jury to leave him alive is a more cruel punishment because he's got to live with it, so Idon't know what to
say to you. I really don't. 92
During the evidentiary hearing, Sawhill claimed that his actions
were part of an informed strategy to "maintain credibility with the jury,
and then present the human side ofhis client during the sentencing phase
in hopes that the jury would spare [his] life."'193 Upon review of all the
facts and circumstances involved in the case, the Eleventh Circuit held
that Sawhill's actions were reasonable and noted that Messer had failed
to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Stricklandtest.
Further understanding of defense "strategy" may be gleaned from
the dissenting opinion of Judge Johnson. Specifically, the dissent found
that Sawhill's questioning of the sole mitigation witness, Messer's
mother, resulted in her testifying that her son expected to receive the
death penalty. 94 This, coupled with both a closing argument that
implied that Sawhill could understand if the jury imposed the death
penalty, refuted the earlier assertion of a strategic decision to rely solely
on the sentencing phase for favorable results, and led the dissent to
believe that Sawhill's conduct fell outside the acceptable range. 9 '
CONCLUSION
It appears that the Supreme Court was correct in its prediction that
many IAC claims would be quickly and easily disposed of through
application of the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. The reason
becomes apparent when one considers that, in Strickland, courts are
instructed to review IAC claims based upon all of the circumstances
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involved. Under this broad direction, a reviewing court is provided with
great latitude in interpreting the effect of counsel's error upon the
proceedings. "It is not our role to assume the existence of prejudice.
Regardless of how plausible a showing of prejudice might be, Strickland
requires that the petitioner "affirmatively prove' prejudice."'"
In addition, even if the claimantmanages to overcome the prejudice
prong of the test, he must still prove that his attorney's actions were
unreasonable and not in accordance with accepted professional norms.
This too often proves to be an insurmountable burden considering the
great deference which reviewing courts grant to counsel's decisions. If
an attorney can in any way justify his actions, and if those actions can be
viewed as reasonable the petitioner will be unable to overcome the
burden of presumed effective assistance.
It would appear that the performance prong of the test is at odds
with other concepts discussed in Strickland. The Supreme Court has
warned reviewing courts of the danger of applying hindsight in their
analysis, and rather, instructs the courts to view and judge the attorney's
actions from his/her point of view. The obvious flaw, however, is that
almost any attorney who testifies during an evidentiary IAC hearing
would be capable ofjustifying his actions, unless they involved some of
the most egregious errors ofjudgment. This fatal flaw in the Strickland
analysis allows the judicial system to favor efficiency over the concept
of fundamental fairness.
Despite the difficulties involved, IAC claims can succeed provided
that habeas counsel completely reinvestigates the case. The governing
law, however, is illustrative of the fact that effective and aggressive
capital defense is principally a matter of internal standards of professional responsibility and personal integrity.
1. U.S. Const. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.")
2. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)("That a
person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the
accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command.")
3. Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,771,
n. 14 (1970).
4. Of 2,393 death sentenced prisoners in the country, Florida in
the Eleventh Circuit houses 313 and Texas in the Fifth Circuit 324.
These two states also lead the nation in executions carried out since
1976: 37 in Texas, 24 in Florida. Virginia stands fifth in executions
with 10. NAACPLegal Defense andEducation Fund, DeathRow U.S.A.
(Sept. 21, 1990).
5. Strickland,466 U.S. at 689.
6. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
7. Id. at 683.
As far back as Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (4932), the basic
case establishing right to counsel in capital cases, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the right may be undermined by institutional
barriers as well as personal incompetence, and that the duty of a state
is not discharged "by an assignment at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case." Id. at 71.
8. Id. at 675.
9. Id. at 678-79.
10. Id. at 686.
("The bench-mark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must
be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.")
11. Id. at 687.
12. Id. at 697.
13. Id. at 689.

It should be noted, however, that despite this aspect of the
Stricklandtest, the Courts frequently seem to utilize "hindsight" to
support holdings adverse to the defendant.
For example, in Smith v. Procunier,769 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1985),
aff d, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the appellant claimed he was denied
effective assistance of counsel due to his counsel's failure to further
develop a defense of mental incapacity. Id. at 173.
Upon review, however, the Court of Appeals noted that it was a
matter ofprofessional judgment for the attorney to determine whether
further inquiry would prove fruitful, and then stated "counsel's
professional wisdom in deciding not to do so was borne out because
both psychiatrists have (at the state habeascorpushearing) indicated
that, had they been asked an opinion as to whether Smith suffered from
a potentially mitigating mental incapacity, the answer in each case
would have been negative." Id.
This clearly indicates the Courts' willingness to utilize "hindsight" in its review, when hindsight vindicates the attorney's actions.
14. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
15. Id. (The Court noted that specific guidelines listing criteria of
effective attorney performance are not possible).
16. Id. at 689.
17. Id. ("[C]ourt[s] must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy"') (quoting Michel v. Louisiana,350 U.S.
91, 101 (1955)).
18. Id. at 692.
19. Id. at 694.
20. Id. at 695. For example, the Court noted that specific sentencing practices of the trial judge should not be considered when determining prejudice).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 697.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 700.
25. 750 F.2d 1238 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088
(1985).
26. Id. at 1240.
27. Id. at 1248.
28. See also, Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487, 1494-96 (4th. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987)(Petitioner alleged that
counsel's failure to present additional mitigating evidence prejudiced
his defense. The Fourth Circuit refused to address the performance
prong of the Strickland test, and found that Whitley did not suffer
prejudice sufficiently substantial to warrant relief).
29. Briley, 750 F.2d at 1248.
30. As discussed in previous issues of the Capital Defense Digest,
defense counsel must be sure to proffer the testimony of any witnesses
who were unavailable or were not allowed to testify.
31. Briley, 750 F.2d at 1248.
32. Ironically, the Court fails to realize that without a thorough
investigation, it would not be possible to know what, if any, mitigation
evidence was lacking.
33. Briley, 750 F.2d at 1248.
34. 753 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd other grounds sub nom.
Turner v. Nurray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
35. Id. at 350. (Turner's claim asserted that the attorneys "did n6t
know the diagnostic implications or the potential dangers from cross
examination of a diagnosis of anti-social personality... [and] did not
acquire the degree of expertise in psychiatric matters necessary to
fully develop the psychiatric defense.")
36. Id.
37. Id. at 348-49.
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38. Id. at 350.
39. Strickland,466 U.S. at 689; See also Evans v. Thompson, 881
F.2d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 1989)(Court held that petitioner was unable to
overcome presumption that his counsel's actions were reasonable).
40. 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865
(1985).
41. Roach alleged that Huntington's disease can cause one to
involuntarily abuse intoxicating substances. Id. at 1479.
42. Id. at 1477.
43. Id. at 1478.
44. See also,Clantonv. Bair,826 F.2d 1354,1358 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988)("When a seemingly lucid and
rational client rejects the suggestion of a psychiatric evaluation and
there is no indication of a mental or emotional problem, a trial lawyer
may reasonably forego insistence upon an examination.")
45. Roach, 757 F.2d at 1478.
46. See, Note 4, supra.
47. 904 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1990).
48. Id. at 977.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 978.
51. Id. at 977.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 813 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079
(1987).
55. Id. at 669.
56. Id. at 670.
57. Id. at 673.
58. Id. at 672.
59. Id. at 673.
60. 764 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1985).
61. Id. at 1176-79.
62. Id. at 1177.
63. 848 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1988).
64. 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1311
(1990).
65. In Romero, counsel did not give a closing argument during the
sentencing phase; In Sawyer, counsel did not give closing argument
in guilt phase.
66. Sawyer, 848 F.2d at 592.
67. Id.
68.Id.
69. Romero, 884 F.2d at 875.
70. Id. at 876.
71. Id. at 877.
72.Id.
73. 755 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026
(1985).
74. Id. at 743.
75. Id. at 744.
76.Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 745.
79. Id. at 744.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 745.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84.824 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1987), vacatedandremanded,478U.S.
1016 (1986).
85. Id. at 1416-17.
86. Id. at 1416.
87. Id. at 1412.
88. Id. at 1415.
89. Id. at 1413.

90. Id.
91.Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1415.
94. Id. at 1414.
95. Id. at 1416.
96. 816 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1987).
97. Id. at 950.
98. Id. at 946.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 946-47 (quoting Stricklandv. Washington,466 U.S. at
689).
101. 818 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1987).
102. Id. at 415.
103. Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
Capital defense counsel in Virginia have further duty to examine
sentencing law. Dependent upon a number of factors, those sentenced
to life imprisonment for capital murder are eligible for parole consideration after serving 25 years, 30 years, or never. Va. Code Ann. §
53.1-151 (1988).
104. See, Czere v. Butler, 833 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1987); But See,
Martin v. State of Texas, 737 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1984)(Failure to
advise defendant of his rights to appointed counsel and appeal constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel).
105. Czere, 833 F.2d at 62.
106. Id. at 64.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. at 693.)
109. See Micheaux v. Collins, 911 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir.
1990)(Petitioner failed to show prejudice under Strickland when
claiming IAC due to misstatement of maximum possible penalty
before entering plea).
110. 817 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873
(1987).
111. Id. at 283-84.
112. Id. at 284.
113. Id.
114. 824 F.2d 879 (lth Cir. 1987).
115. Id. at 883.
116.Id.
117. Id. at 885.
118.Id.
119. Id. at 887.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 887-88.
122. Id. at 888.
123. 829 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929
(1988).
124. Id. at 1538.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 897 F.2d 709 (4th. Cir. 1990). See, case summary of Justus
v. Murray, Capital Defense Digest, this issue; See also, Hobart, State
Habeas in Virginia:A Critical Transition,Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.
130. 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1978), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1108 (1975). See also, Hobart, State Habeas in Virginia:A Critical
Transition,Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
131. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
132. Justus, 897 F.2d at 712.
133. Id. at 711.
134. 895 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990).
135. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
136. See, Murray v. Giarratano,109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
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137. Coleman, 895 F.2d at 144; citing Wainwright v. Torna,455
U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982)).
138. 871 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3202
(1989).
139. A Sandstrom claim asserts that a jury instruction has unlawfully shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, or raised apresumption of guilt. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
140. Waye, 871 F.2d at 20.
141. Id.
142. See also, Giarratanov. Procunier,891 F.2d 483 (4th. Cir.
1989)(Petitioner unsuccessfully sought to defeat procedural barthrough
claim of IAG).
143. Waye, 871 F.2d at 20-21.
144. 812 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1987).
145. Id. at 956.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 957.
148. Id. at 960; See, Endnote 7, supra.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 961.
153. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
154. See Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 872 (1988).
155. 846 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 872
(1988).
156. Id. at 651.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citingAlstonv. Garrison,720 F.2d 812 (4th. Cir. 1983)).
160. Id. at 652.
161. Id. at 653.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 858 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1315
(1989).
165. Id. at 1481.

166. Id.
167. Id. at 1485.
168. Id. at 1487.
169. Id.
170. 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1989).
171. Example of statements made by defense counsel: "Ne may
have committed a horrible crime and he did commit two horrible
crimes, but his is still a human being with a soul despite the blackness
of the crime that this man has committed." Id. at 499, n. 17.
172. Id. at 498.
173. Brown v. Rice, 693 F. Supp. 381,395-97 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
174. Brown, 891 F.2d at 500.
175. U.S. App. LEXIS 16115 (4th. Cir. 1990);.
176. Lexis at 13.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 19.
179. Id. at 17.
180. Id. at 22.
181. Id. at 23.
182. 751 F.2d 1432 (5th Cir. 1985).
183. 868 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1989).
184. Mattheson, 751 F.2d at 1440.
185. Id. at 1441.
186. "I'm not saying there's reason to let this man walk out of
here. I'm not saying to do that. I wouldn't insult your integrity in any
form or fashion in asking you to do that." Rushing, 868 F.2d at 805.
187. Id.
188. 760 F.2d 1080 (lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1088
(1986).
189. Id. at 1089-90.
190. Id. at 1088.
191. Id. at 1089 n. 5.
192. Id. at 1097.
193. Id. at 1090.
194. Id. at 1091.
195. Id. at 1094.
196. Czere v. Butler, 833 F.2d at 64 (quoting, Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 693.)
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Last Spring we noted that the cost of publishing and mailing Capital
Defense Digest is quite significant. We noted further that the Digest is
intended to serve the Commonwealth, that its purpose is to assist capital
defense counsel by increasing the fund of knowledge available to the
entire legal community, including judges and prosecutors. We asked that
those who believed that the Digest is helpful and should continue in the
widest possible distribution consider defraying a portion of the cost.
The response has been gratifying, and we hope it will continue. The
amount contributed does not represent a major percentage of the publication cost but it is a clear endorsement of the continuing need for the
Digest.
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